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CIVIL RESISTANCE OR HOLY OBEDIENCE?
REFLECTIONS FROM WITHIN A COMMUNITY OF
RESISTANCE
ANDREw W. McTiENiA, JR.*
INTRODUCTION

There is a long tradition in American society of individuals and groups
resisting enforcement of the state's law and asserting obedience to higher
moral authority as the reason for their opposition.' Such resistive activity
is generally labeled "civil disobedience" and discussion has centered on
whether or not it is "justifiable."
As a preliminary matter, I want to argue with the characterization of
this activity as "disobedience" and to suggest that a .less pejorative term
should be used for its description. The term "civil resistance" is both more
inclusive and less conclusionary. It is by no means a foregone conclusion
that those who resist enforcement of the law are disobedient. Their actions
may or may not constitute civil disobedience. However, the longtime practice
of using negative phraseology to describe this conduct has depicted the
state's claim as having the greater credence. To grant the high ground to
the state, without considering the resisting community's argument that it is
seeking to be obedient to its own authority, summarily relegates the "resister" to the inferior position of always having to play catch up or seeking
to justify her "disobedience." 2 In fact the real issue may be, and could be
from most points of view, that it is the state which should justify its law.

* Professor of Law, Washington and Lee University School of Law, Lexington,
Virginia. I am grateful for the advice and assistance of Randy Bezanson, Sam Calhoun, Ed
Enoch, Emily Harben, Stanley Hauerwas, Allan Ides, Judy McMorrow, Brian Murchison,
Doug Rendeman, Lisa Rodgers, Tom Shaffer, and Joan Shaughnessy, all of whom read an
earlier draft of this essay and reacted to my.notions. I will be forever grateful for those sisters
and brothers who stood with me on the picket line at Moss 3 and who prayed with me as we
decided to resist the law. A grant provided by the Frances Lewis Law Center allowed me to
read and reflect on the Appalachian region.
1. W. SToaRNFELLOW, FREE IN OBEDIENCE (1964); M. L. King, Letter From Birmingham
City Jail, in A TESTAmENT OF HOPE-THE ESSENTIAL WRrrNms OF MARTIN LuTHER KING, JR.
289 (J. Washington ed. 1986); H. D. Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, in WALDEN AND OTHER
WRIrros 85 (J. Kautch ed. 1962); SwoRDs INTO PLowsHARs: NONVIOLENT DIRECT AcTION
FOR DIsA.RmNT (A. Laffin & A. Montgomery ed. 1987) [hereinafter SwoRDs INTO PLoWsHAES].
2. Professor Robert Cover has made the point that from its own perspective the resisting
community "that has created and proposed to live by its own, divergent understanding of law
makes a claim not of justifiable disobedience, but rather of radical reinterpretation." Cover,
The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Forward:Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARv. L. REy. 4, 4647 (1983). The issue, he contends, is one of interpretation; to concede that role to the courts
is to deny the resisting community "the integrity of a law of its own." Id. at 47.

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:15

The term "civil resistance" includes not only those activities which may
prove to be "disobedient," but also those acts of opposition which ultimately
may be validated by state law. In the 1980s, for instance, nuclear protestors
requested and, on occasion, were permitted to interpose, the legal defense
of "necessity" to acts of resistance. In at least two regionally well-known
cases, juries instructed on the necessity defense acquitted all defendants. On
occasion courts sitting without juries acquitted on the grounds of necessity
as well. It is illogical to continue to portray these protest activities as
"disobedient" when the state's own legal machinery has declared their
actions not in violation of law.' In general, I will describe those activities
used to challenge existing legal structures as "civil resistance."
A second preliminary and a caveat. While I approach this topic seeking
to better understand the place of civil resistance in American law, I am not
a dispassionate observer. I am a friend of and have been an advisor to
Christian communities of resistance. Additionally, I was a participant in an
active civil resistance campaign in connection with United Mine Workers of
America strike against the Pittston Company in 1989. 4
The description of a bucket as being half-full or half-empty conveys as
much information about the one assessing the water level as it does about
the volume of water in the bucket. That is also true for the topic of civil
resistance. Lawyers seek to explain the world in terms of one's obligation
to obey the law. There is some wonderful scholarship exploring this topic
from the perspective of the legal community, but there are few instances
of a resisting community describing to the law what it thinks the stakes
are.5 One of the unfortunate aspects of this silence is that discussion focusing
on the legal justification for civil resistance often remains abstract and

3. People v. Jarka, No. 002170, Circuit Court of Lake County, Waukegan, Illinois

(1985); Chicago v. Streeter, No. 85-108644, Circuit Court of Cook County, Chicago, Illinois
(1985). For a discussion of the necessity defense allowed in those cases, see Boyle, Defending
Nonviolent Civil Disobedience Against the Reagan Administration Under InternationalLaw,
in CRu
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 110 (1985); Lumpkin, The Necessity Defense: A Report, in
SWORDS INTO PLOWSHARES, supra note 1, at 191.
4. This strike was one of the longest coal strikes in recent history, lasting nearly 12
months. While it involved only 1,700 UMWA miners and a single coal company, the Pittston

Company, and was confined to a four or five county area in the central appalachian region,
the strike achieved world-wide publicity. The workers drew support from a wide spectrum of

American society. There were more than 60,000 workers from around the world who visited
the picket lines in Virginia. Without question one of the major reasons for this widespread
interest in what normally would have been a small regional strike was the nonviolent strategy
of the union. See, e.g., "Pittston Should Stand By Its Promises," Bus. WEEK, Oct. 9, 1989,

at 182 ; "Pittston Power," THE NATION, Oct. 16, 1989, at 409; "Strike Zone, The Appalachian
Intifada Rages On," The Village Voice, Aug. 29, 1989, at 32.
5. See, e.g., Ball, Obligaiion: Not to the Law But to the Neighbor, 18 GA. L. Ry.
911 (1984); Greenawalt, Promise, Benefit, and Need: Ties That Bind Us to the Law, 18 GA.
L. Rav. 727 (1984); Olsen, Socrates on Legal Obligation: Legitimation Theory and Civil
Disobedience, 18 GA. L. Rav. 929 (1984); see also R. DWORKIN, TAXING RcnmS SERIOUSLY
81-130 (1977).

1991]

CHRISTIAN RESISTANCE

devoid of passion. Another and perhaps even more unfortunate result of
the one-sided nature of this debate is that we are left with a language
monopolized by the law. The discussion would be richer, and I think
sharper, if we considered the story from the perspective of a community of
resistance. I hope that I can bring that perspective to this discussion. As a
lawyer I know that many of my sisters and brothers at the bar sometimes
appear unable to understand the claims that civil resisters make. On the
other hand, it is all too often the case that resisting communities think that
law and lawyers are beyond redemption. There is a very real tension between
these worlds-the majoritarian community, with boundaries to a large degree
defined by law, and a smaller community of resistance, which places its
primary allegiance in a power beyond itself. And the tension will not, indeed
cannot, disappear with greater understanding. But understanding of the
resisting community's position would allow the law to recognize its own
limitations and to be clear about what it might do when challenged.
Likewise, some understanding of the law and lawyers might force a community of resistance to know that so long as it believes the law to be
beyond redemption, then that community itself is not yet redeemed.
In the first part of the essay I want to discuss some aspects of obligation
and resistance fiom the perspective of a resisting community. I am at the
outset troubled by the need to describe this community. Even the use of
the word community may be claiming too much. In some sense the groups
I am talking about are fringe coalitions, temporary in nature, never large
or permanent enough to have a plan of action for the reconstruction of the
world-a blessing I think; but still coherent enough to hear and exercise
the prophetic voice of the Hebraic tradition which is now so atrophied in
the institutional church. What these groups all have in common is that they
confess that Jesus is Lord. It is on that basis then that I assert the claim,
which is at the same time normative as well as descriptive, that what I am
talking about as a community of resistance is the church.6 It may seem

6. My equating a community of resistance (composed of various fringe groups of the
church) with the church has caused some concern for initial readers of this essay. Their concern
is twofold: first, some think it factually inaccurate to claim that the church is a resisting
community, or a community apart in American society. In effect, they make the point that
the concept of an American civil religion is so pervasive that one cannot, in any meaningful
way, call the church a resisting community. They contend its institutional interests so closely
parallel the interest of the existing order and its personnel are so intertwined that in reality
the church and state are one. The Constantanian arrangement is so pervasive that the public
perception is that we are still a "Christian nation." Second, some readers think my view of
church is too limited and excludes from that larger body other competing visions of the gospel.
The first criticism assumes that I am factually incorrect. The church is not, they say, a
community apart. The second is that I am too exclusivistic in my claimed description of
church. It is to the effect that I am making a normative claim when describing what the
church is. I recognize both of these problems. All I can suggest by way of defense is to
confess and avoid. Factually, I know that the Christian church is a minority group in America,
and I know that my particular vision of the gospel is at one corner of that minority group.
But at the same time I contend that I am on sound theological grounds by claiming that when
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strange to describe the church as a resisting community. But there is a very
real sense in which the church as church, by its very nature, always stands
opposed to the state-as well as all other principalities and powers in the
world. When it is not in some state of tension with the law-that is, when
it does not resist the seduction to violence which is so integral a part of
the law-it is in all likelihood failing in its role as the church.
Briefly, I will argue that the church has the political and spiritual
obligation of witnessing the absoluteness of God in a secular state which
claims no higher power than its own aspiration. Civil resistance is then not
only a morally acceptable form of witness, it may be required of the
Christian community.7 The relationship between smaller or insular communities and the larger society whose norms are expressed in the law is
affected by many things, not the least of which is the relative size of each
body. The status of the Christian community as a minority one in a
pluralistic and secular society ought to offer some insight on what civil
resistance by that religious group implies. While resistance is permissibleand perhaps even required-the Christian community may be obliged to
speak to the state, but it cannot speak for the state.
There are many smaller communities both secular and religious within
the larger body known as the state. It is by no means the case that the
nature of obligation owed by the membership to these communities is
coterminous with the obligation to the state as defined in the law. s It is to
be expected that obedience to the norms of the smaller community will put
such a group in tension with the law. How the church views the law is then
of critical importance in deciding when it can obey.
The calculation which a secular group generally makes is based on both
a consideration of its claim to obligation and its power to effect change. I
am thinking here of some environmental groups, Greenpeace for example,
or gay and lesbian rights activists such as ACT-UP. Does the group have
the power to force the state to change or at least to back off and let its
members live in peace? The resistance of the church, on the other hand, is
not based upon a claim to power, but on the invocation of memory. And
two or more are gathered together in His name, we are the church.
My view of what the church ought to be, its vocation, is not what the church is to most
Americans. I understand that. I also understand that my view of the vocation of the church
is not that of a majority of my sisters and brothers who also claim that Jesus rose. At least
since the Reformation there have been peculiar and different versions of the Jesus story. When
sufficiently large numbers coalesce around one particular version of the story, they are called
a denomination. If those who coalesce around a version of a story are small in number and
radically challenge the dominant story, we generally label them "sectarian." That is always a
safe way to exclude and ostracize groups within the church. In fact, that is often the way that
the Supreme Court excludes and ostracizes all religions by equating the term "religious" with
sectarian. See Baer, The Supreme Court's Discriminatory Use of the Term Sectarian, 6 J. OF
L. & POL. 449 (1990).
7. See W. WINK, UNMASKING TE POWERS: Tan INvIsIBIE FORCES TMAT DETERMINE
HUMAN EXISTENCE 98 (1986); see also W. STRINGFELLOW, supra note 1, at 89.
8. See M. WALZER, OBLIGAnTONs: ESSAYS ON DIS0BEDIENCE, WAR, AND CrnzENsmP 16-

23 (1970).
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that memory is of a people whose charge was to be faithful and know that
its power is in powerlessness. 9
Because the Christian community is one which, when true to its own
tradition, reasons differently from many secular communities, I will attempt
in the second part of the essay to suggest how the church gains clarity on
the nature of obligation. This portion of the essay is nontraditional and
may appear strange to readers who are unfamiliar with that community. It
is in the form of a reflection on one of the sacred stories of the Christian
tradition. It is offered not as a model of reasoning for the law and the
legal order, but as an illustration of the way in which this particular
community-apart called the church discerns what questions are important
when it looks at the nature of obligation. My experience has been that it
is very difficult for the secular world to understand how religious communities themselves come to decision. On the one hand, detractors of civil
resistance often talk of the danger of anarchy10 and cannot fathom that the
community is not seeking power, but merely to be faithful. Even among
those who support the claim of resisting communities, there is often a grave
misunderstanding of what the community is about. Many see the goal as
replacing an existing order instead of transformation."'
This reflection on obligation is set in the fabric of the 1989 United
Mine Workers of America-Pittston Company strike.1 2 I offer it as an
illustration of the way in which a community of resistance comes to
knowledge in the midst of the anguish and bitterness of a fallen world; that
is, how the church becomes the church.
When the obligations and norms of a smaller community conflict with
and cannot be accommodated by the law of the state, then that smaller
entity must decide whether to resist the state, and if so, what form that
resistance should take. Here the Christian community must confront the
Pauline admonition to be subject to the governing authorities. 3 In addition,
if the community engages in activity which is determined to be disobedient,
then it needs to acknowledge the reality that the state must be willing to
resort to violence to secure the primacy of its law.14 I conclude with a brief
consideration of these issues in the third part of the essay.
I.

STANDING WITHN A COMMUNITY OF RESISTANCE

Most discussions of this topic begin by phrasing the issue as whether

one has an obligation to obey the state's law. But then one must ask what
9. See Shaffer, The Tension Between Law in America and the Religious Tradition, in
OF OuR LIFE TOGETHER 28-53 (R. Neuhaus ed. 1989).
10. Powell, A Lawyer Looks at Civil Disobedience, 23 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 205 (1966).
11. See the discussion of the political revolutionary in Simon, Visions of Practice in
Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. Ray. 469, 494-95 (1984).
12. See supra note 4.
13. Romans 13:1. "Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there
is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God." (Revised
Standard).
14. See, e.g., Cover, Violence and The Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986).
LAw AND THE ORDmuw
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is the law, the enforcement of which is being resisted? That question, often
assumed to be relatively straight forward, may be more complex than it
appears on first blush. To decide what the law is requires some interpretation." And that immediately raises the question, whose views shall prevail?
Since an act of interpretation is never carried out in a vacuum, a decision
about what the official law is depends to a considerable extent on what
activity is presented as a challenge to it.
That leads to a host of inquiries about the nature of the resisting
community, the relationship of that group to the larger community called
the state, and the proposed activity of resistance.16 Those questions, in turn,
require that consideration be given to the nature of the moral obligation
which the resisting group asserts as the controlling authority of its life as a
community. The resisting community's own requirement of obedience to
moral precepts must be considered in light of the demand for obedience
asserted by the state. And that takes us back to the starting point. What
is the claim that the state makes as it asserts the primacy of its law? And
so on.
Where to enter the debate is essentially an arbitrary choice, but it is
not without consequence. If it is assumed that the state's law is clear (an
assumption often unexamined in many of these discussions), then the
question is posed in terms of an obligation to the state. Law reviews and
legal writers generally present this as the question to be examined-is there
a proper role for civil resistance in American law? 7 If it is granted that, in
certain instances, resistance is permissible, then the discussion turns to what
sorts of protest activities are within the canon of acceptability.
If, on the other hand, the inquiry begins with an assumption that the
resisting group has an important internal obligation, then the next series of
questions would be quite different. It would become necessary to articulate
the nature of that internal obligation and to determine what obedience to
the authority of the community entails. Finally, the resisting entity would
have to confront the state and distinguish between those requirements for
civil obedience which honor the authority of the tradition and those which
betray that authority. 8 How the analysis proceeds depends to a large extent
on where one stands.
I am part of a community which, in the course of the last two thousand
years, has often found itself at odds with the official policies of the state.19

15. See, e.g., J. Wm, HERCUIES' Bow-ESSAYS IN THE RHETORic AND PoEncs oF THE
LAW (1985); J. Wmm, WHEN WoRDs LOSE THEm MEANING: CONSTITUTnoNs AND RECONS'nTUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER AND CoMMuNrrY (1984).

16. See Cover, supra note 2, at 46-53.
17. See Simon, supra note 11, at 490-95.
18. Tom Shaffer puts it this way: we must distinguish between "the civil obedience that
honors God and the civil obedience that betrays the Hebraic ideal of love of neighbor."
Shaffer, Jurisprudencein Light of the Hebraic Faith, 1 NoTa DAM J. oF L., ETENCS AND
PUB. POL'Y 77, 86-87 (1984).
19. See W. STRINOPELLow, supra note 1, at 89.
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That community is the Christian church. I have spent a good deal of time
with smaller groups of Christians who challenge state authority. I have
friends who are members of self-described Christian communities of resistance. During the last decade, many of these groups engaged in active
resistance challenging our government with respect to its national defense
and Latin American policies. On occasion, I have served as a lawyer or
legal advisor to these groups. 20
I want to attempt to describe what the concept of obligation means
and to suggest some ways in which it is appropriate to live out that obligation
in a society in which Christians are very much a minority people. In part,
this effort is designed to get "our side" of the story out to a culture which
all too often hears only the voice of the law and lawyers. In a very real
sense, I think that unless Christian resisters can tell their stories unhampered
by the imposition of another's translation, the witness has little chance of
being understood and will unfortunately be discounted even by their allies.
However, an equally important reason to start from within and tell the
story from the perspective of a resisting community is so that we, as
Christians, will get our own story straight. Often when we think and talk
of civil resistance, we tend to forget who we are. Instead of thinking of
the Ten Commandments, we think of the United States Constitution. 2 We
think less of witnessing to a God who has determined the course of history
and often assume that we can by our own actions take control of history.?
We sometimes think less of joining with the powerless as suffering servants
and more of using the power of rhetoric to overwhelm the state. So I write
not just to persuade Caesar that what we do is justifiable when we resist
the law, but to urge the resisting community to tell the truth about itself.
Until we in the church can be the church, we can have little to say to
Caesar about civil resistance that is useful.
A.

The Nature of Obligation of the Community

Faith in and obedience to one God is the starting point in our narrative.
The first commandment is this: Hear, 0 Israel: the Lord our God
is the only Lord. Love the Lord your God with all your heart, with

20. While my formal involvement has been with those having left-leaning political
agendas, I have maintained friendship and informal relationships with anti-abortion Christian
activists. It is difficult to unite these disparate ends of the political spectrum in the church.
Although my politics place me on the left of the political spectrum, I think it is crucial that
all of us somehow extend to each other what we claim we offer Caesar-an alternative to
violence based on the love of God. Perhaps one way we can do that is to talk with each other
about who and whose we are. For an admirable effort in that regard, see DiSalvo, Abortion
and Consensus: The Futility of Speech, the Power of Disobedience, 48 WAsH. & LEE L. Ray.
219 (1991).
21. See J. YODER, THE PRIEsTLY KNGDOM 172 (1985); R. BmTA , I-Lrrs oF THE HART:
INDvImuAnIsM AND Co
Im NT IN AMRucAN Lim (1985).
22. See W. STmsuGFIO0W, CONSCIENCE AND OBEDIENCE, THE Pourrcs oF RoMANs 13
AND REvELATiONS 13 IN LioHT OF THE SECOND Coma 89-94 (1976).
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all your soul, with all your mind, and with all your strength. The
second is this: love your neighbor as yourself. There is no other
commandment greater than these.?
All else and all other claims to obedience must be judged against this
standard. The state is not God; the law is not God. Only God is God.
Whenever we transfer our ultimate allegiance to anything else, including
specifically the law, we are guilty of idolatry. While there are many questions
we must puzzle through as we figure out how we will live and act in a
secular world, we cannot lose sight of our primary obligation.
The second obligation is to our neighbors. How we deal with these two
obligations, to love God and to love our neighbors, determines whether we
are a faithful people. Implicit in the command to love God and neighbor
is the assertion that all human law is founded on God's law and that the
purpose of and justification for our legal system is to create the kinds of
structures which permit these relationships to grow.? We do not think law
is evil; indeed it is a gift from God. We are charged to respect civil
authority, not because the state says we should, but because our own sacred
text tell us to do so.75 However, we cannot be lulled into accepting the
notion that submission to civil authority is the same as unthinking obedience
to that authority. There will always be times and places where our obligations
to God and neighbors put us at cross purposes with the state. But before
we confront that issue, we need to consider our place in the larger community known as the state.
B.

The Minority Status of the Christian Community

The story to which we try to be faithful-our generative narrative-is
a very specific one. 26 It is that God entered into human history in the person
of an itinerant rabbi named Jesus. He spent some time in an occupied
territory teaching and associating with all sorts of people, most of whom
seem to have been at the margins of society. He preached a message and
lived a life which offered a whole new definition of what it means to be
human. His agenda was personal and extremely threatening to the political
and religious establishment because almost everything he said and did called
into question the administered arrangements of the existing world. The
message was so radical and he so threatening that he was tried and killed
in the name of the law. If the story ended there, it would be just one more
tragic event in a fallen world. However, it does not end there, because
three days later he rose from the dead. The resurrection is what makes the
story unique-and we believe that therein lies God's ultimate saving power.

23.
24.
25.
26.

Mark 12:29-31.
See H. BERmAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION 81-86 (1974).
See Matthew 5:17-20; Romans 13:1.
See generally M. GOLDBERG, JEws AND CHRISTINs, GETTING OUR STORIES STRAIGHT:
THE EXODUS AND THE PASSION-RESURRECTION (1985); M. GOLDBERG, THEOLOGY & NARR.ATvEA CRITCAL INTRODUCTION (1982).
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A small minority of the first century world believed the truth of that
story and became part of the Jesus movement. Today, some two thousand
years later, those of us who still believe the story to be true have inherited
the challenge of affirming a particular witness without being concerned
about the need to show that others who do not believe the story are
"bad." 27 We do not claim to be able to prove that our view of the world
is right. Our job is not to establish empires or even to persuade others to
change the law. It is instead to try to live out the awesome truth of that
simple story: that the suffering of the crucified Christ represents the wisdom
and power of God and that the resurrected Christ here and now represents
God's victory over the fear and thrall of death. It is in the everyday
ordinariness of life that this God who defies all commonsense is revealed
to us. Ours is a particular heritage and our task as Christians is not to
persuade the world that the Jesus movement makes sense, but to decide
every day "whether-when he meets us in our world, as he does in factwe want to follow him."
A major problem for many of us who seek to follow Jesus is that from
the perspective of our own faith, we do not reason correctly. We reason as
if everyone, or at least a majority of the world, accepted our story as true.
We have forgotten that we are, as were the early Christians, a minority
people. 29 The church lost a critical purchase on its ability to see the world
clearly when, at the time of Constantine, the church and the state united.30
From that time forward, too often we have seen our duty as less to be
obedient to a call of radical servanthood and more as an obligation to
contribute to the success of the state. That radical shift in position-seeing
the world from the top down instead of from the bottom up-left us
disoriented. Ours is a failure of memory. We reason and think as if we
were a majority and yet we are, in fact, strangers in a strange land.
The early church considered Jesus as Lord who sat at the right hand
of the Father and ruled over history. While first century Christians were
not convinced that the world had been totally subdued, they did believe
that the principalities and powers could not prevent the ultimate Christian
victory. 3' But following the conversion of the Emperor Constantine, the
state and the church were partners. God's presence was understood as
supporting the rulers of the world. That was a critical move in shifting
thought patterns and premises for reasoning. Before these events, the church
knew that it was a small confessing community; it knew that God was in
control of history.
After Constantine's conversion, Christendom included everyone and all
knew for a fact that the sovereign was God's own agent. The revised goal

27. See J. YODER, supra note 21, at 55.
28. Id. at 62.
29. See W. MEEKs, THm MORAL WORLD OF THE FiRsT CHRiSTANS 161-62 (1986).
30. See J. YODER, supra note 21, at 135-47.

31. See id. at 61.
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was to strengthen the sovereign because God was concurrently present in
the government. The issues to be decided revolved around what those in
power should do with that power, not what a powerless minority should
do to remain faithful. The sovereign as God's agent had all sorts of interests
to balance in the running of an empire. He could not be a weakling. He
had to protect the public order, and as God's agent, he had a warrant to
resort to violence to accomplish that purpose. This type of reasoning led
to compromises with state power such as the just war concept. 32
In the Christian community, servanthood became less important than
the glorification of God's empire.3 3 This new universality loosened the bond
of solidarity which had existed within the early Jesus movement. It changed
the sorts of questions asked of sisters and brothers. The great "what if"
appeared. "What if" everyone eschewed violence, "what if" everyone loved
their enemies? Such questions must have been unknown to the early movement. The form of language had to change to accommodate a people who
had come to view themselves as God's agents in running a government.
One would not, in such a newly configured world, ask what Christian
' 34
conscience demanded. The thought process turned to what was "effective.
But once the church starts worrying about "effectiveness," it has
succumbed to the power of death by doubting the power of the resurrection.
If God is in control of history-that is, if the resurrection is what we claim
3
it to be-then we do not need to worry about success or effectiveness.
Our job is to follow that God who is in control of history. To be obedient
means not to let other institutions (i.e., the law) claim our primary obligation
and subvert that obligation to our neighbor. That means the Christian
community must be respectful but wary of the claims of the law.
C. How the Community Might View the Law
My friend, Tom Shaffer, suggests that we believers who also are lawyers
need to look out from the church at the law to see if the law has become
an idol. 36 If it has, we must proclaim that fact even if the law and many

32. See J. YODER, supra note 21, at 137; J. YODER, TBE PonIcs OF JESUS (1972).
33. That same move from servanthood to empire was also a problem for the nation of

Israel.
When the liturgy moves from the experience of the peasants to the sponsorship of
the king, a new dimension is added. The king also has to translate this TALE-BECOmELrTrURoY into Ptinuc PoICY. That translation of tale into policy is both difficult and

dangerous for the tale will scarcely sit still long enough to become policy....

Mhe

king wants to take the tale-become-liturgy seriously, but he is faced with a deep

dilemma. Will he allow the liturgy its full voice, thus perhaps jeopardizing his very
empire, or will he allow the empire its full voice thus perhaps jeopardizing the very
"world" mediated in the liturgy? Clearly the king cannot have it both ways, but

W.

either choice is extremely costly.
PRaSE: DOXOLOGY AGAINST IDOLATRY

BRuEGGEmANN, IsRAL's

34. J. YODER, supra note 21, at 138-39.
35. W. STRiNOFELLow, supra note 22, at 75-85.

36. See Shaffer, supra note 9.

AND IDEOLOGY 90

(1988).
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of our most sincere fellow believers do not like it or do not care what we
think. Shaffer uses the image of believers standing on the steps of the
church looking across the street at the courthouse (the law) and trying to
figure out what goes on over there.3 7 If we were to do that, then I think
we would have to report our puzzlement. We would have to report that
there is much that is positive about the law and the legal system. We could
point to the fact that much of what is positive about the law can be traced
to the union of church and state occasioned by the baptism of Emperor
Constantine. While that Constantinian arrangement may have skewed the
church's view of who it is, most would agree that the law is much richer
for its rootedness in the papal revolution of the eleventh century. s The
church can be proud of the claim made by Professor Harold Berman that
"[w]ithout the fear of purgatory and the hope of the last judgmehit, the
western legal tradition could not have come into being." 3 9 So we would
report that our law owes its existence to a belief system, the linchpin of
which is that Jesus rose. That is the good news for a believer. The sobering
news is that while our legal rationality is still rooted in Christianity, the
law has only a vague knowledge of the claims of that belief system from
whence it cameA0
Realism would seem to counsel that the Christian community should
be less interested in urging the creation of a Christian nation or even of
"reintegrating law and theology' 41 than in trying to discern what it means
to be faithful in a world which increasingly considers its basic story either
incredible or irrelevant. But we continue to sponsor symposia on the
reintegration of law and theology and to have White House prayer breakfasts
attended by many religious leaders who seek to make the United States a
Christian nation. All of which goes to show how seductive power is. Even

37. See id.
38. See generally H. BERm.N, LAW AND REVOLTInON: THE FoRmATIoN OF THE WESTERN
LEGAL TXAnmON (1983).
39. Id. at 558.
40. "Long after the legal tradition forswore itself of any dependence upon medieval
faith and well after many of its operators lost all religious faith, the conceptual infra- structure,
the basic categories, the skeleton of the formative world still remain." Bradley, Book Review,
39 EMORY L.J. 217 (1990) (reviewing J. Wrmrn & F. ALExANDER, THE WEIGHTER MATTERS OF
THE LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND REmGION (1988)).
41. Id. at 251. Bradley concludes a long essay on the break up of law and religion with

what I think is the sensible admonition that we need to recognize the world as it is rather
than forge some short-lived reconnection.
An underlying common fault of public theology as a whole is that we do not have
completely pre-linguistic experiences which are merely, or subsequently, symb6lized.
Rather, our nurturing, in a tradition of symbols, constitutes our experience. Hence,
we cannot leap over religious pluralism by Winstanley-like appeals to common core
experiences. Because of this, the break-up of Christendom and the resulting pluralism
is the starting point for all further discussion of community. Woody Allen put it
well: "The lion may lie down with the lamb, but the lamb won't get much sleep.
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as a minority people we continue to have dreams of imperialism. 42 So we
must take care that we are not blinded as we look at the law. Berman's
account of the roots of the law and his vision for its reunification are both
dependent on the persistent and irritating presence of the prophets, and
that is difficult because the prophet, who has to have a place to stand
within the church, is without a voice in the imperial palace.
While we in the church did not have much trouble accommodating
ourselves to the relationship of power when the church and Caesar were
united, we have had a great deal of difficulty accepting the reality that we
are once again a confessing minority. We still prefer models of partnership
with power as opposed to servanthood for the powerless. We think more
of effectiveness than obedience. There is some hidden impulse which seeks
to place the power of political authority behind our particular belief system.
We continue to search for some way-and we see the law as the tool for
that operation-to define a kind of universal ground, a meta language,
which saves us from admitting that ours is a claim grounded in a particular
belief system. This affects the way we who are lawyers think about the law.
We worry more of reintegrating law and theology and less of telling the
truth to the law. That impulse to power and quest for universality weakens
our ability to be detached and skeptical.
We need to be particularly skeptical of the claim the law makes to
justify itself. The secular state acknowledges no higher power than its own
idolatrous aspiration and seeks to subvert the church to the role of legitimating the state's claims. 43 We can justifiably celebrate the influence of
Christianity on the development of the western legal tradition without
succumbing to the temptation of idolatry by putting our faith in the service
of the law. However, we also need to understand that our obligation is less
to change the law and more to say who and whose we are. Because we
have ourselves been less than vigilant about being centered in the particularity of our own story, we have been open to seduction by the law. All
too often we allow the state to frame moral arguments in terms of good
citizenship, instead of insisting that our job must be to carry out the often
lonely and unpopular political and spiritual task of proclaiming the absoluteness of God."

42. Writing nearly twenty years ago, William Stringfellow said:
The incidents which occasioned the Constantinian Arrangement, as such, are not as
significant for contemporary Christians, or for either church or state today, as the
ethos spawned and nourished by that comity and the mentality which has been
engendered and indoctrinated by it over so long a time. It is, put plainly, an ethos
which vests the existence of the church in the preservation of the political status
quo.... [T]hat has caused radical confusions in the relations of church and nation,
church and state, church and regime. It has encouraged and countenanced stupid
allegiance to political authority as if that were service to the church . .. and to
God.
W. STRnoFLOW, supra note 22, at 48-49.

43. W. WiNx, supra note 7, at 96.
44. Id. at 96-98.
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There is little tension between the keepers of the law and the institutional
church so long as the church's offering of a morality of aspiration remains
at the safe level of abstraction. That is, when the church acts as a chaplain
to the law and asks God's blessing on the enterprise, all or nearly all,
applaud. But when the church seeks to recover its nearly atrophied prophetic
voice, the witness is not so welcome. 45 How then does the church come to
be the church, and what does it mean to be the church when its witness
involves active resistance to the law? It is to those questions that the essay
now turns.
II.

COMING TO KNOWLEDE-A REFLECTION ON NEIGHBoRLINEss

A.

A Word About the Process

Professor Milner Ball has asserted that there is no duty to obey the
law,4 but there is an obligation, which admits of no exception, to the
neighbor. Ball, who speaks from within the Hebraic tradition, makes a
persuasive case, and while I find myself in basic agreement with his thesis,
I might phrase it somewhat differently. The major, and perhaps the only,
justification for the law is to create those structures in which the obligation
to love one's neighbor can be nourished. Opening our hearts to the neighbor
begins the redemption of the world. The political and spiritual obligation
of the Christian Church is to "create a society where it is easy for people
to be good." 47 In the likely event that the law gets in the way of or
compromises that obligation to the neighbor, then the Christian community
needs to decide how and whether it will confront the law.
Consistent with the approach of this essay, I want to explore, from
within the tradition, what is involved when the Church sees those claimsobligation to law and to neighbor-as being in conflict. This is a matter of
some importance to me and my thinking does not rest on a comfortable
level of abstraction. As a participant in church-based civil resistance during
the United Mine Workers of America-Pittson strike of 1989, I had to wrestle
with the matter of obligation long and hard. And like Jacob, I now walk
with a limp as a result of that wrestling match. 48 The limp is an important
reminder of how difficult it is to be faithful and how dangerously vulnerable
to the seduction of power we always are. So to a large extent, I shall be
reporting on my own experience and that of my sisters and brothers as we
tried to discern how to act when a major issue for us was the apparent
conflict between what the law of the state seemed to mandate and what we
thought was required to be faithful to the obligation to our neighbors.

45. W. WunK, NAm.NG THE PowERs 113 (1984).

46.
47.
Dorothy
48.

See Ball, supra note 5, at 113.
A news article in 57 Catholic Worker 2 (Aug. 1990) attributes this comment to
Day and Peter Maurin.
See Genesis 32:24-32.
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That process of coming to knowledge is, I think, of crucial importance.
It is, in fact, more important to the resisting community than the decision
as to the form the ultimate witness will assume. 49 It has been my experience
that those outside the church, often including political allies, do not recognize the significance of this focus on process. That failure to understand
often begins with lawyers who serve resisting communities. 0
The theological point is that God is in control of history; the victory
has been won, death is vanquished. Nothing we can do would be more
49. While there is a surface parallel between the emphasis on process here and the
emphasis on process in American law, the reason why process is important in biblical religion
is that it is so imperfect while the truth we seek is perfect. The reason process is so important
in American law is because we know that the law is so imperfect and, therefore, we rely much
more on process to keep us from making serious substantive mistakes as we stumble along.
50. My discussions with representatives of the peace movement, who come at the issue
from a faith-based perspective, reveal that this "client group" often (generally?) perceives that
it is inadequately represented by lawyers. At the risk of overgeneralization, let me describe my
impressions of.what the religious left perceives about its attorneys. First, they are all goodhearted, generally sympathetic to the cause, and very competent. But. And from here on, my
comments are very impressionistic. Basically, .there are three types of lawyers that represent
the left religious movement in this country.
There are the associates and partners in large law firms who are sympathetic to liberal
causes. These lawyers tend to think not of the power of witness to the system, but focus on
freedom of religion. For this kind of lawyer, freedom and autonomy are paramount values.
These lawyers see the "system" as defined by traditional law and want to ensure that the law
is tolerant of dissenting views. I think they would "sanitize" the political nature of dissent
and urge tolerance to make civil resistance fit in.
A second group is composed of the criminal defense lawyers who think first and foremost
about keeping their clients out of jail-a worthy goal in most all instances. However, jail may
be the most appropriate place for this sort of witness. Although I have never done very much
criminal practice, my limited experience with that kind of work leads me to believe that the
mindset of the criminal defense lawyer is not likely to be one which sees the goal of civil
resistance as transformation.
There is a third group, the radical lawyer group, which sees their representation as
intensely political. However, often that group sees itself as an outside group, and its goal is
not to transform and thereby vindicate the existing order, but to overthrow it.
What I think the left religious community wants is not the cool, detached representation
of liberal lawyers, nor even the passionate representation of the criminal defense bar, nor the
system-bashing of radical lawyers. Instead it wants lawyers who are willing to enter into
representation with the possibility that they too may be transformed. For instance, in a
planning session on civil resistance, rather than have lawyers who appear at the appropriate
time to fit into an allotted ten-minute slot and discuss procedures to be followed on arrest,
the religious community wants a lawyer who will become an integral part of the spiritual
process of discernment and decisionmaking on whether to engage in civil resistance itself. That
is a hard fit for us, given the traditional notion of what lawyers do and who lawyers are. But
I think it is necessary to really come to terms with the political nature of the witness. It is
also necessary if lawyers are to get beyond the distinction between working within and being
outside the system. What the religious community seeks is to transform the system. The view
is that initially we are all outsiders. Until all of God's people can sleep in peace, none of us
can. Until all are fed, we are all hungry. Until all have a place to lay their heads, we are all
sojourners. The Hebraic tradition is radical precisely in that it refuses to recognize a distinction
between insiders and outsiders. That is the theological position which drives the religious left,
and unless its lawyers can appreciate and in some sense live out that radical position, then the
entire witness is weakened.
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effective than that which God has already done.51 The job of the church is
to be faithful and to love the neighbor knowing that it is only possible to
love one's neighbor because God first loved us. To act as if our witness,
whatever form it takes, is one which would put God's word in triumph
over the power of death is fundamentally to misunderstand the resurrection.
It is to assume that the resurrection is somehow not yet complete.5 2 It is to
succumb to all the temptations to power which Jesus wrestled with and
defeated in the wilderness.
To live in grace is to live knowing who and whose we are. What we
do is far less important than that. Our witness for a more just society
results from the knowledge that Christ will come again as judge and king,
and in the meantime, we are charged with witnessing to the power of the
resurrection. It is not so important that we be right. The church does not
have, hold, or exercise any strength against the principalities. The church
is free to proclaim the resurrection, and because the God whose victory we
proclaim is a merciful God, it is not so bad if we are wrong.
I offer these comments and this reflection not in an effort to justify to
my critics my own resistance, nor in an effort to persuade a reader that
civil resistance is "acceptable." What follows is offered in the hope that
those who do not share our common story will at least have some better
53
idea of who we are and why we do what we do.
While this account draws heavily on the experience of attempting to
sort out what it means to be a neighbor in the pain and bitterness of an
Appalachian coal strike, the basic process of discernment is not limited to
that situation. It is as old as the church itself.
The theoretical and spiritual underpinning of the process is that the
church, in order to discern what it is to do, must first know who it is. The
goal is personal transformation of the participants. 54 Civil resistance is an
act of corporate witness; it is never a solitary act. One of the major fears
which plagues Christian communities of resistance is that good-hearted, but
often self-deceived, political activists will drop in for a "CD action" and
then ride off into the sunset. That type of "blow-in, blow-off and blowout" action destroys the sacred nature of the witness. There is no assurance
that a corporate discernment process can subdue the big "I," but there is
a good deal of evidence to support the proposition that without some serious
and sustained corporate effort at discernment, self-righteous moralism will
55
take the place of true Christian witness.

51. See W. SThINGFELLOW, supra note 22, at 84.
52. Id.
53. What we are about is learning how to tell the world of the sovereignty of the word
of God acting in history. We live in anticipation of the second coming which is the consummation of Christ's reign so that what is now secret, or known dimly, is known to all so that
what is witnessed biblically is publicly vindicated. W. STRINGFELLOW, supra note 22, at 83.
54. Douglas, Civil Disobedience as Prayer, in SWORDS rTO PLOWSHARES, supra note I,
at 94-95.
55. T.

MERTON, MYsTIcs AND ZEN MASTERS

287-88 (1967).
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The process of discernment is basically twofold. First, the community
gathers and together explores the sacred story. Following an initial reading,
one or more members may offer some initial exegesis which is designed not
to lead toward finality of interpretation but to open the story for further
reflection. The goal is to reenter the world of the story-to probe it for its
own treasures. In the Good Samaritan story, 6 for instance, the effort is to
go beyond the abstraction of the command to love one's neighbor and to
appreciate what Jesus meant when he quoted the necessity for the love of
a neighbor in his conversation with the lawyer. Before we in later times
declared that Jesus was Lord and put our own interpretation on his ministry,
how did Jesus understand the obligation to one who was a neighbor? That
sort of inquiry involves looking backward at the story with as little gloss
of our own world view as is possible.5 7 That is a far different exercise than
one which seeks to pull the unexamined letter of the text forward and apply
it to life in present day America.
As a second step, and only after the community has attempted to
project itself backward into the world of the first century, the group then
examines the story in.
light of existing reality in order to better understand
how the word can shape its response as a community. The goal is to find
that subtle intersection between the story and the life of the community
where the "aha" happens, where "the corner is turned,-where in short,
we encounter the living God addressing us at the point of our and the
world's need."5"
I want to replicate a slice of that process in this portion of the essay.
What is reported here is necessarily truncated and incomplete, but I hope
that it is sufficient to give some sense of a community struggle. I am almost
embarrassed to write this section without surrounding it entirely in quotation
marks, for in a very real sense I am merely reporting what I learned from
small communities of Christians as we struggled with the story of the Good
Samaritan and attempted to come to grips with its power in our own lives.
The words are mine, but the insights came from corporate discussion.
B. An Examination of the Text
The place to begin this examination of the obligation of neighborliness
is in the all-too-familiar story of the Good Samaritan. We all know the
story, or have at least heard it scores of times. It is so comfortable that
we are tempted to close our minds as we mouth the words. But if we
suspend our preconceived understanding and come to the story afresh, we
will see something of the radical nature of the command to love one's
neighbor. It collapses all our familiar categories and turns traditional thought
patterns inside out.

56. Luke 10:25-37.
57. W. WINK, TRANSFORMNG BMLE STUDY 126-27 (1980).

58. Id.
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And behold, a lawyer stood up to put him to the test, saying,
'Teacher, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?'
He said to him, 'What is written in the law? How do you read?'
And he answered, 'You shall love the Lord your God with all your
heart, and with all your soul, and with all your strength, and with
all your mind; and your neighbor as yourself.'
And he said to him, 'You have answered right; do this, and you
will live.'
But he, desiring to justify himself, said to Jesus, 'And who is my
neighbor?'
Jesus replied, 'A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho,
and he fell among robbers, who stripped him and beat him, and
departed, leaving him half dead. Now by chance a priest was going
down that road; and when he saw him he passed by on the other
side. So likewise a Levite, when he came to the place and saw him
passed by on the other side. But a Samaritan, as he journeyed,
came to where he was: and when he saw him, he had compassion,
and went to him and bound up his wounds, pouring on oil and
wine; then he set him on his own beast and brought him to an inn,
and took care of him. And the next day he took out two denarii
and gave them to the innkeeper, saying, 'Take care of him; and
whatever more you spend, I will repay you when I come back.'
Which of these three, do you think, proved neighbor to the man
who fell among the robbers?'
He said, 'The one who showed mercy on him.'
And Jesus said to him, 'Go and do likewise.
The parable begins with a question. But we know that the lawyer is
not altogether an honest seeker of truth. He wants to test Jesus to determine
whether his views are acceptable to the religious establishment. But the
question sounds innocent: "[WIhat shall I do to inherit eternal life?"
Jesus, in a classic rabbinical manner, turns the question back on his
interlocutor: "How do you read?" He treats the lawyer in a straightforward
manner and does not allow himself to be drawn into a defensive discussion.
The lawyer then responds with the passage with which we are all familiar.
His answer comes in the vein of the Old Testament tradition and combines
language from the texts of Deuteronomy and Leviticus. Jesus joins the
argument, and they both stand squarely within the Hebraic tradition. There
is no attempt to proof text or pull in additional authority. The passage
becomes a basis for reflection, and presumably, the answer is in the story.
Jesus' answer is both affirming and at the same time challenging. He
responds: "You have answered right." But he goes on to refine the question
and place the issue in the here and now-"do this, and you will live." It
is not 'do this and you shall achieve eternal life in the hereafter.' The
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Kingdom is now. 9 The obligation to one's neighbor is turned from a
theological abstraction to a social event in the reality of the present.
And this is where the story gets interesting. The lawyer must have
realized that he painted himself into a corner. The text imposed a seemingly
impossible burden, but so long as it remained abstract, it was not so
threatening. Jesus' spin on the lawyer's question forces him to confront the
world as it really is. Nonetheless, the lawyer asks the next question, as the
text says, "desiring to justify himself."
If I must love my neighbor as myself, then tell me: who is my neighbor?
The questioner might be thinking to himself that 'if the universe of neighbors
is sufficiently small,' or 'if the list is fairly short,' or 'if you draw the circle
tight enough' or 'if the notion of obligation is confined within the bounds
of reasonableness,' 'then perhaps I can do it. . . .' To a lawyer, these
distinctions are perfectly reasonable avenues for inquiry. That is what the
law is for; to draw lines and give us clarity in an otherwise uncertain world.
So where do you draw the line-who is an insider and who is an outsider?
Is a neighbor only a good practicing Jew? Does it include all Jews? What
about proselytes? Certainly there is a line somewhere which defines the
obligation of community and of neighborliness. We all want help in drawing
that line.
But Jesus does not give the sort of response that the lawyer seeking
clarity hoped for or expected. Instead he tells a short but powerful story,
which, like all parables, raises more questions than it answers.
We are introduced to a scene which is both stark and brutal. A man
has been stripped, beaten, and left for dead beside the road. He is never
identified, and that causes a problem. Identification is an important issue
in ascertaining one's obligation. If the man had been identified, it would
be possible to know whether he was inside or outside the community; that
is, whether he was one of those people to whom an obligation was owed.
One way to identify a stranger is by his dress. But since this man has been
stripped, he c~nnot be identified by visual means. Another way of identifying
a stranger is through conversation, which would involve talking with him.
In this instance, that is probably impossible, since a man who is half-dead
is most likely unconscious.
By chance, a priest is going down the road. He is most likely returning
from his fortnightly duty at the temple in Jerusalem. And this priest has a
problem. How is he to discover whether the wounded man is in fact a
member of his community? The system makes it important that he find
out. If the stranger is a member of the community, the priest has an
obligation to lend him assistance. If he is not, then there is no obligation.
But the structure which defines his obligation so clearly is of no aid in this
circumstance because the priest does not know who the man is. 0

59. See J. YODER, supra note 31, at 39.
60. This insight into the importance of and difficulty in identifying the stranger was
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To make matters even more complicated, it is possible that the man is
dead already or that he will die while the priest is attending him. If the
priest comes in contact with a dead man, then the priest will be defiled. If
one is defiled, he must go through an extremely elaborate cleansing ceremony
which would require the expenditure of a great deal of time and money.
He cannot, while he is defiled, collect tithes or eat. Nor can the priest's
family collect tithes and offerings until he has been cleansed. In short, the
priest's whole world of relationships will be upset if he comes under the
ban of defilement. 6'
The priest is really between a rock and a hard place. If he assumes that
the man is not a member of his community, then he can proceed down the
road and avoid any possible interruption of his life that might result if he
stops. By deciding that the stranger is not a member of the community,
the priest is able to keep his orderly world intact. At the same time, he
fulfills the letter of law.
Next the Levite comes to the place. Although the text is silent about
the facts, it is possible that he has been assisting the priest at the temple
and is also on his way home from Jerusalem. If this is the case, he would
know that the'priest was on the road ahead of him. That makes his decision
an easy one. If the priest passed this stranger by, then the priest must have
made a determination that the man was not a member of the community.
The Levite would not want to second guess a priest and so he goes on after
making only a cameo appearance. Deference to hierarchy and to authority
have always been convenient substitutes for the agony of moral choice.
Note that the progression of those on the road is first a priest and
second, the Levite. An attentive listener might well expect the third person
that came along would be a lay representative who also has served as a
participant in temple services. These lay representatives formed an important
bridge between the "professional" religious establishment and the regular
community. And how would that individual evaluate the situation?
But here comes the radical reversal. The third person who came along
was a Samaritan. And this Samaritan had compassion, went to the man,
"bound up his wounds", took him to the inn, and paid from his own
pocket for his keep. Here was a Samaritan, a hated foreigner, who "had
compassion." Imagine the courage of Jesus even telling the story to that
audience. The two words-good and Samaritan-simply do not work together. Jesus is asking the audience here to "test" themselves, to think the
unthinkable.
Finally, Jesus turns the question inside out and back on his interlocutor.
He never responds to the lawyer's self-centered question which was who is

taken from a tape recording furnished to a bible study group considering the parable of the
Good Samaritan. Although the tape was obviously a commercial one, identification of the
speaker could not be determined. He was very insightful and had obviously thought a good
deal about the parable. I cannot give appropriate credit for the insight.
61. See generally Numbers, ch. 19.
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my neighbor? Jesus asks the lawyer who is neighbor to the wounded one?
The neighbor is one who has broken free of the bonds of narcissism and
has poured out his life for the wounded and broken man by the side of
the road.
C. Some Community Responses
As with a first century audience, the story compels us to reach to the
very center and conceive that which our culture tells us is inconceivable. It
does not tell us what to do. Parables never do that. Instead they tease and
finally shock us into radical uncertainty by breaking down all our preconceived notions about what is right and proper. This story destroys our
commonsense by showing how ultimately nonsensical our own line drawing
is.
Yet the law depends on the daily exercise of drawing lines. The law
must have some way of defining right conduct. One way is to exclude
certain forms of behavior and to say simply that illegal conduct is that
which is on the other side of the line. There are countless other illustrations
of the same phenomenon. That is troublesome theologically because now
the legal definition of our own rectitude means that our goodness is only
shown by its absence in someone else. That is our sin-our all too human
goodness-and it is more debilitating than we like to think. We do not like
to see it in ourselves, we can only sneak up on it and take a quick glance
at it through stories like that of the Good Samaritan. It is important to
recognize that the priest and the Levite are not some depraved figures; they
are instead respectable, law abiding people-moral pillars of the society.
That is finally what is wrong with the priest and the Levite and what is
deficient about the law as any repository of moral aspiration. Any system
that requires that we define our goodness by another's lack of it inevitably
leaves us in the position of drawing lines, of separating sheep from goats,
righteous from unrighteous, good from bad, sick from well. And as long
as we draw lines, we carefully and with consummate skill will place ourselves
on the right side. As long as we draw lines, we will be hard pressed to
remember that, in this context, we are exactly like our neighbor, lost and
in need. Just like the priest, who defined his moral obligation by the law,
we will pass on by. Just like the Levite, who allowed the necessity for the
ordered world of hierarchal relationships to determine his response, we will
pass on by.
During the course of the strike of 1989, there were scores of prayer
meetings in which Christians of diverse social and cultural backgrounds
wrestled with the precise questions raised by the story. Our gatherings were
to pray for wisdom and strength as we decided whether and how to resist
enforcement of the law when we were told to move from the public way
so that coal trucks could pass. Most of us came to these gatherings with a
good dose of self-righteousness. We were, after all, standing on the side of
justice. Many of us had spent days on the picket line, talking to our
neighbors, and planning various events designed to attract attention to our
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cause. Few of us were prepared for what happened as we began to listen
to the word.
We would rather quickly conclude that the law placed a much greater
premium on order than it did on justice. It was relatively easy to discern
that the state, by entering the dispute to limit picket line activity and
arresting protestors who sat in the road to block coal trucks, was siding
with the oppressor. After all, it was Pittston that unilaterally had terminated
health benefits to widows, pensioners, and disabled miners-surely among
the most vulnerable groups in the region-fourteen months before the strike
began. We were simply standing in solidarity with those neighbors whom
Pittston had neglected. How could we be better neighbors?
But ever so slowly questions would bubble up which we did not want
to hear. And they would not go away. Is my neighbor the oppressor? Is
my neighbor the one who would take my job? How do I love my neighbor?
It is easy to love my neighbor when she is on the picket line standing in
solidarity with me, but what about the replacement worker who is now
doing my job? Is Paul Douglas, the CEO of the Pittston Company, my
neighbor? Is my neighbor the replacement worker that I have conveniently
dehumanized by referring to him as a scab? Sometimes the questions were
too painful and we shut them out, but when we trusted the process some
incredible things happened. Let me offer two brief vignettes. 2
One occasion involved a woman from the Appalachian region who had
been active in the recovery efforts following the Buffalo Creek disaster of
1973,63 a flood which killed more than 100 people and which was caused
by Pittston's negligent construction of a dam. She confessed her long-term
hatred for Pittston. She asked for the strength to love the CEO and to
think of the employees at the home office in Connecticut as sisters and
brothers. In response, another woman, the wife of a disabled miner whose
health care benefits had been terminated by Pittston, told her own story of
the destructive power of hatred. This woman, who also had lost a father
and brother to coal mining accidents in Pittston mines, told how difficult
it had been for her to ever forgive the company, but that she had finally
discovered she would never be free to live her own life unless she surrendered
that bitterness. Only when her faith had penetrated so deep that she could
actively pray for the person who was acting like her enemy, had she been
able to let her bitterness go.
An older man I knew, who in prior strikes had often resorted to
destruction of property, expressed strong dissatisfaction with the entire
nonviolent strategy of the strike. For weeks he complained that in the old
C
62. I have many of those stories, but I only offer two of them here.
63. There are numerous accounts of the Buffalo Creek disaster, many of which are
familiar to lawyers. Perhaps the best known of those is the account of the subsequent class
action lawsuit by Gerald Stem, which has become a staple of many civil procedure courses in
the last several years. G. STrR, THE BuaFALo CREEK DISASmR (1976).
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days they would have had the strike settled in a couple of days. "All it
would take was blowing a bridge or tipple and that would have stopped
the production of coal." He stood on the picket line watching a replacement
worker, whom he knew, taking over his job. He cursed the nonviolent
strategy as inaction. He came to those prayer sessions with great reluctance
and only because a relative dragged him there. He often asked what God
had to do with the strike. For him, real power was in dynamite planted
under a bridge or a coal tipple. Yet somehow he came and listened to his
friends wrestle with the problem of obligation to love one's neighbor.
Finally one evening he asked if his friends would pray for him so that he
might be able to pray for the replacement worker doing his job.
To the extent that the witness of the church was valuable it was because
the community thought small. The Good Samaritan story has that effect.
The discernment process forced us time and again to realize that if we were
to reach out to the stranger by the side of the road, it had to be a very
personal encounter. Living out that story in the reality of a broken world
does not permit the church to hide behind the anonymity of large numbers.
As we were repeatedly required to examine our own attitudes about our
adversaries, we were forced to pray that in the confrontations with police,
replacement workers, security guards, or company officials, we would
remember that we were all bound together in our desire for safety and in
our complicity with violence. Somehow that recognition took away the
preoccupation with violence and on occasion permitted us to recognize that
our strength was not in our ability to change another's behavior; instead,
it was in our willingness to trust in a power greater than ourselves. We
came to appreciate that the absolute vulnerability of the Samaritan, who
risked his own life to aid the stranger in the road, was finally his strength.
And that was true for the church when we acted as the church. That focus
on powerlessness finally allowed us to abandon the quest for some measure
to judge our effectiveness.
Whether sitting in the road and disobeying the command of the Commonwealth to move on was the right thing to do can never be known.
There is no safe ground. There is no assuredly correct answer. We always
live contingently. Ours was a claim that we were fulfilling an obligation to
neighbors. We did come to know that the position we were asserting could
only have validity as long as we were prepared to live it out as our own
vision. We prayed that the same God who on the cross at Calvery absorbed
the violence of the world, would absorb the violence in us which all too
often made us insist on being right at the expense of being obedient. When
we forgot those lessons, which we did on more than one occasion, it was
usually because we did not take the time to explore together the awesome
task of loving our neighbors.
III.

CONFRONTATION WITH TIM STATE

At some level, the church is always in conflict with law; and that
conflict intensifies when the church acts in ways inconsistent with the
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apparent command of the sovereign. But that conflict is, I think, healthy
for both the church and the law. When world views are challenged, then
the protagonists to the conflict must look at their respective foundations to
see what is really at stake.
All too often the church recites its liturgy and sings its hymns but
neglects to remember the transformative stories that give it life. It mouths
the words but cannot hear the voice which wants to question and challenge
what has been settled by conventional wisdom." The priests of the law talk
of its aspirations and point with some justifiable pride to its origins in the
church, and yet never acknowledge that to insure its own survival the law
6
must rely on a willingness to resort to violence. 1
And that is the divide. The church, when it challenges the law, if it is
to be the church, cannot resort to violence. The law, on the other hand,
to be effective must stand ready to back its pronouncements with force.
No matter how much the law seeks to justify its activities strictly as
matters of interpretation, no matter how many levels of bureaucracy separate
and isolate the Supreme Court from the executioner who pulls the switch,
there should be no mistake-the law is in bondage to violence. It is not
that the law is evil, merely that it is fallen. Most of the world knows only
two responses to violence-fight or flight-and that version of reality is
woven into the fabric of the law. Robert Cover captures its essence: "Were
the inhibition against violence perfect, law would be unnecessary; were it
not capable of being overcome through social signals, law would not be
possible."6'
But there is another way; a third way which is neither fight nor flight.
It is the example of Jesus, who overcame the violence of the world by
absorbing it himself. The church, as the body of Christ, has that same
fundamental mission to proclaim an alternative to violence.
The witness of the church when it is in conflict with the law is, I
believe, twofold. On the one hand it stands over and against the law and
proclaims its freedom from the bondage of violence. At the same time, the
church is in the position to stand with the law and celebrate those aspects
of the law which permit justice to flourish. The law is, after all, a gift
from God; to honor that gift which is so much a part of our common life
together is to honor God. If the church is to be that sort of witness to and
against the law, it cannot withdraw and remain aloof. The relationship
between the church and the law is never "one of uncritical allegiance or
obedience." 67
While opponents of civil resistance point to Romans 1368 as ruling out
disobedience as a form of witness, the text does not support that argument.

64. W. BRuaowmANN, supra note 33, at 90.
65. See generally Cover, The Bonds of ConstitutionalInterpretation: Of the Word, the
Deed, and the Role, 20 GA. L. Rav. 815 (1986); Cover, supra note 14.
66. Cover, supra note 14, at 1613.
67. W. STmNosau.ow, supra note 1, at 93.
68. Romans 13:1.
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A thorough examination of that text is beyond the scope of this essay. 69
However, it should be noted that the text itself does not command obedience.
The instruction is to be subject to government. A Christian who is subject
to the state still retains her moral independence and judgment. The authority
of government is not self-justifying. The government is ordered by God,
but the biblical text does not say that whatever the government does or
asks of its citizens is good. What the text calls for is not obedience but
subordination, and that is significantly different from obedience. The fact
that Jesus accepted subordination but not obedience and was willing to
suffer death, is itself an act of participation in the affairs of the government.
The Sermon on the Mount admonishes us to love our enemies and to
be nonresistant in our relationships within the social order.70 Both the
Sermon on the Mount and Romans 13 call us to respect and be subject to
the state and to bring about a new kind of order by our suffering witness.
The power of the Gospel is that we are freed of the responsibility of making
sure that everything turns out to suit our taste. God is in control of history.
We are called to be obedient to him. That means to act in love. It does
not mean to always obey the existing order, only to be subject to it.
To accept the view that we are obliged to be obedient to the state is to
fail to remember that both the cross and the holocaust are symbols of what
humans do to each other in the name of the law. We can be subordinate
without also being obedient. But to contest the power of the state we must,
I think, do it in love.
When the church and the state offer conflicting views of obligation,
that minority community, the church, must consider what it will do when
the state asserts the primacy of its own system. That is, the church must
explain its stance in the face of opposition. Acquiescence in the state's
interpretation reinforces the state's claim. Confrontation or resistance on
the other hand challenges that claim. Resistance to the official law, if it is
to capture our imagination and permit the law to grow, must be based on
a powerful story. But it cannot be based on power. It must be redemptive.
Any story of resistance which deviates from the example of the life and
death of Jesus and substitutes violence for the loving resistance and suffering
made normative in Jesus is not holy obedience.
CONCLUSION

I have gone on long enough. Those who came to this essay seeking
direction for the law's proper response to religious based resistance will
remain unsatisfied. Those in religious communities seeking a blueprint and
justification for civil resistance will likewise remain unsatisfied. What I have
tried to do is to tell a story of resistance from within; how we come to
decision, how we reason about things and what we see from our point of

69. For extremely valuable accounts of the apparent conflict between Revelations 13 and
Romans 13, see J. YODER, supra note 32, at 193-232; W. SmxNox'aow, supra note 22.
70. Matthew 5:1-7:29, specifically 5:43-47.
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view. I am sensitive to the problem that any attempt to justify or claim
superority for the story undermines it. How well we tell it has not a little
to do with how it will be received. But whether the story is persuasive is
ultimately beyond our control. Even more important than the telling is how
we live it out. It is a simple story to tell but it is not easy to live. If we
tell it honestly, it may be possible to find the courage to live it. At least
that is my hope.

